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Abstract
Background: On 1 January 2006 a number of far-reaching changes in the Dutch health insurance
system came into effect. In the new system of managed competition consumer mobility plays an
important role. Consumers are free to change their insurer and insurance plan every year. The idea
is that consumers who are not satisfied with the premium or quality of care provided will opt for
a different insurer. This would force insurers to strive for good prices and quality of care.
Internationally, the Dutch changes are under the attention of both policy makers and researchers.
Questions answered in this article relate to switching behaviour, reasons for switching, and
differences between population categories.
Methods: Postal questionnaires were sent to 1516 members of the Dutch Health Care Consumer
Panel and to 3757 members of the National Panel of the Chronically ill and Disabled (NPCD) in
April 2006. The questionnaire was returned by 1198 members of the Consumer Panel (response
79%) and by 3211 members of the NPCD (response 86%). Among other things, questions were
asked about choices for a health insurer and insurance plan and the reasons for this choice.
Results: Young and healthy people switch insurer more often than elderly or people in bad health.
The chronically ill and disabled do not switch less often than the general population when both
populations are comparable on age, sex and education.
For the general population, premium is more important than content, while the chronically ill and
disabled value content of the insurance package as well. However, quality of care is not important
for either group as a reason for switching.
Conclusion: There is increased mobility in the new system for both the general population and
the chronically ill and disabled. This however is not based on quality of care. If reasons for switching
are unrelated to the quality of care, it is hard to believe that switching influences the quality of care.
As yet there are no signs of barriers to switch insurer for the chronically ill and disabled. This
however could change in the future and it is therefore important to monitor changes.
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Background
On 1 January 2006 a number of far-reaching changes in
the Dutch health insurance system came into effect. There
is now one type of health care insurance for all, where
there used to be public insurance for approximately 60%
of the population and private insurance for the other
40%. The basic package is compulsory for everyone who
lives in the Netherlands or pays wage tax in the Nether-
lands. Insurance companies are not allowed to select
favourable risks or to differentiate the premium according
to (proxies for) risk. On a macro level, insurance premi-
ums are half based on nominal premiums and for the
other half income dependent [1]. In the new system of
regulated competition switching between health insur-
ance companies or policies plays an important role.
Insured persons are free to change their insurer and insur-
ance plan every year. Insurers must accept every applicant
for the basic package. In the old system of health insur-
ance, people could also switch insurance company. How-
ever, the situation was different for the publicly insured
and the privately insured. The publicly insured could
switch, the nominal premium was much lower and there
was less accessible information on premium and service
level of insurance companies. The privately insured could
also switch, but as a result of risk selection and premium
differentiation many were actually locked in with their
insurance company.
Internationally, the Dutch changes are under the attention
of both policy makers and researchers. The Dutch health
insurance reform is part of a broader transformation
towards a regulated market for health care. Specific infor-
mation on the new Dutch health insurance system is
given in Table 1. Competition between health insurance
companies is not unique for the Netherlands. Other coun-
tries with competing health insurers are for instance Ger-
many, Switzerland, Belgium and the USA [2-5].
Introducing more choice in health care is a general trend
in western countries [6,7]. The policy assumption is that
greater choice of health plans improves quality and lowers
costs [8]. Insured can both switch to another health plans
from the same insurer, and to another insurer. The focus
of this article will be on switching to another insurer.
Switching between health insurers and the threat that peo-
ple can do so, is supposed to induce insurers to adapt their
offers to the preferences of their insured. However, it can
be discussed what the actual impact of enhanced choice
will be, due to legal and non-legal restrictions to con-
sumer choice [9].
The extent to which people indeed exert their freedom of
choice is first of all important from the point of view of
the assumptions behind the reforms. Assumptions are e.g.
that people indeed want to have more freedom of choice
concerning their health insurance company or policy and
that they choose on the basis of parameters that are rele-
vant to improve the cost – quality balance. Secondly, the
extent to which people actually use the possibility to
switch between insurers is important from the point of
view of unintended consequences of introducing more
choice. If some categories of people have more difficulty
in exerting their freedom of choice, they might forego the
fruits of system reform and new inequalities might arise.
The Dutch health insurance reform was explicitly
designed to prevent the development of such inequalities
through a standard basic insurance package, the ban on
risk selection, and by stimulating the availability of trans-
parent information. However, according to market transi-
tion theory in general, transitions of planned economies
to markets bring about new inequalities [10,11]. There
will be (groups of) people who will benefit from it more
than others.
Switching between insurers is an important pillar in the
new system. The international literature shows that the
numbers of people switching health insurance are usually
low. The actual level depends on the availability of choice
options, market structure and institutional features, the
benefits of switching, and individual inclination, related
e.g. to ties to the current insurance [4]. The idea behind
regulated competition in health insurance is that insured
persons who are not satisfied with the premium or quality
Table 1: The Dutch health insurance system after the insurance reform of 1 January 2006
Health care insurance law • Introduced on 1 January 2006
• Abolition of distinction between private and public insurance
• Insurance under private law with public limiting conditions
• Obligation for every citizen to take health insurance
• Risk adjustment
Insurance policy • Free choice between insurance organisations
• Basic package (identical for everybody)
• Choice between in-kind and restitution policy
• Additional insurance (no obligation to accept, not necessarily with same insurer as basic package)
• Choice of deductible (min. €100, max. €500)
• No-claim premium restitution
• Collectives (via work or other) get premium reduction up to 10%BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
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of care provided, or just can get a better deal, will opt for
a different insurer. This would force insurers to strive for
good prices and quality of care for their insured. It does
not imply that all insured who are dissatisfied should
switch to another insurer nor that only dissatisfied people
switch. According to Hirschman, the mechanism will
work best when some insured go to another insurer, thus
showing their dissatisfaction, while others remain with
this insurer, thus providing the resources for the insurer to
improve [12]. Still, switching will only influence both
price and quality if there are indeed differences between
insurers and if the insured base their choice on these
aspects [8]. For collective contracts it might be that
insured simply choose a collective contract without con-
sidering the price-quality balance. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to examine which people tend to switch more and
what their reasons are for doing so.
There are indeed differences in premium. Information
about this is easily accessible on the internet (e.g. [13]).
Differences in quality of care for the insured of different
insurance organizations are much less clear if they exist at
all. Recently, the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa)
reported that there are hardly any differences between the
basic packages from different insurers, but there are differ-
ence in complementary insurance [14]. For the relatively
young and healthy, quality aspects are less important than
premium. We therefore expect relatively young and
healthy people to switch more often than people who are
older and/or in less good health. The latter are also more
dependent on their insurer and might not switch because
they know what they have, but do not know what they
will get when going to another insurance company.
Relatively young and healthy people will base their choice
of insurance plan probably on considerations like pre-
mium or paperwork related to switching insurance com-
pany, considerations that are unrelated to quality of care.
This was found in several European countries, including
the Dutch situation before the recent insurance reform
[15-18]. Only people who frequently use health care, such
as the chronically ill and disabled, have substantial expe-
rience with health care to base their choice on considera-
tions that are related to the quality of health care. It is only
these groups that can provide insurance companies a sig-
nal related to the quality of health care [19]. Thus, a dif-
ference in reasons for switching can be expected between
those who use health care frequently, and those who do
not use health care on a frequent basis.
An interesting aspect of the new Dutch health insurance
system is the possibility of collective insurance contracts
[20]. Any group of people, e.g. united through their work
place, a sports association or patient organization, can
take out insurance at a discount of maximum 10% on the
basic insurance package if an insurance company is inter-
ested to offer a collective contract. Insurance companies
are not allowed to base discounts on the relative risk of
the people for whom the collective offer is available. The
size of the discount can only depend on the size of the col-
lective. Collectives are interesting for (at least) two rea-
sons. First of all, access could be (unintentionally) easier
for some people, such as those with a job which are
mainly people in good health. And secondly, for those
who have access to collective insurance, the choice situa-
tion is less complex. Information overload might lead to
stress [21]. If the number of health plans to choose from
is too large, people are less inclined to switch because of
increased costs of collecting information and coming to a
decision [17].
In this article we compare actual switching from insurer
and stated reasons for switching in the general population
and a specific group of insured: the chronically ill and dis-
abled.
In this article two questions will be answered:
1. How many insured switch insurance company in the
new system and are there differences between population
categories, defined in socio-demographic and health char-
acteristics?
2. What are reasons and barriers for switching? What is
important in choosing an insurance package? Do these
reasons and barriers differ according to socio-demo-
graphic and health characteristics?
We hypothesize that:
￿ Young and healthy people are more inclined to switch
insurer than elderly and chronically ill or disabled people.
￿ The chronically ill and disabled are less often insured via
a collective contract.
￿ People who do not often use health care, healthy
insured, attach more importance to the level of the pre-
mium, while people who use health care frequently,
chronically ill or disabled, attach more importance to the
content of the insurance package.
￿ Being able to join a collective is an important reason for
switching but less often for the chronically ill and disa-
bled.
Methods
Questions on switching health insurer and insurance plan
and reasons for doing so were asked to the Dutch Health
Care Consumer Panel, a cross-section of the Dutch popu-BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
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lation (N = 1516) and the National Panel of the Chroni-
cally ill and Disabled (N = 3800) in April 2006.
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel
The Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel consists of about
1500 people and is representative for the general popula-
tion for age and sex. Members of the panel receive a ques-
tionnaire four times a year. Members can quit the panel
any time. Every two years, one third of the panel members
is renewed. This renewal ensures that the panel remains a
cross-section of the population, that members do not
develop specific knowledge of and attention for health
care issues and no "questionnaire-fatigue" occurs. New
members for the panel are sampled from the general pop-
ulation. Sampled people receive an information letter
about the panel and are called within a week after receiv-
ing that letter. If they are interested they receive first a
questionnaire on background characteristics. When that
questionnaire is returned they are considered members of
the panel.
National Panel of Chronically ill and Disabled
The National Panel of Chronically ill and Disabled
(NPCD) is a nationwide data collection and research pro-
gramme investigating the need and use of care and living
circumstances of chronically ill and disabled people (15
years and older) in the Netherlands [22]. Chronically ill
patients were recruited via a representative sample of 29
general practices in order to have medically assessed diag-
noses. Disabled people were selected through a screener
question on disabilities in two large-scale regular popula-
tion surveys. Panel members take part into the panel dur-
ing four years. The NPCD is representative for the
population of independently living people of 15 years
and older with a (somatic) chronic illness or disability. All
data are standardized to a standard population based on
the proportion between the number of chronically ill peo-
ple and the number of disabled people in the Dutch pop-
ulation.
Data collection
In April 2006 postal questionnaires were sent to 1516
members of the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and
to 3757 members of the National Panel of the Chronically
ill and Disabled. Among other things, members of both
panels were asked about their choices for a health insurer
and insurance plan and the reasons for their choice. The
questionnaire was returned by 1198 members of the
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel (response 79%) and
by 3211 members of the National Panel of the Chroni-
cally ill and Disabled (response 86%). The protection of
the collected data from both panels was laid down in pri-
vacy regulations, safeguarding ethical consent, and regis-
tered by the Dutch Data Protection Authority (nr.
1262949 and nr. 1283171).
Analyses
As the chronically ill and disabled are older than a sample
from the general population, the panels used for this arti-
cle are not comparable on age, sex and education (Table
2). A weight factor for the chronically ill and disabled was
used to make both panels comparable on these character-
istics. A total of 18 weight factors were used for the com-
bination of age (18–44; 45–65; 65 and older), sex (male;
female) and education (lower; intermediate; higher). For
two reasons both the unweighted and weighted results
will be presented. First, weighting influences conclusions
being drawn. Differences in switching behaviour and rea-
sons might not be related to chronic illness or disability
but to socio-demographic composition. Second, although
differences between both populations might primarily be
determined by characteristics like age, sex and education
the fact remains that the population of the chronically ill
and disabled is older, has a higher percentage of women
and is lower educated, compared to the general popula-
tion. Cross tables and logistic regression were used to test
the hypotheses. For these analyses we used the statistical
program SPSS version 14.0.
Results
Switching health insurer
Unweighted figures show that 14% of the chronically ill
and disabled switched insurer at the introduction of the
health insurance reform (Table 3). In the general popula-
tion the percentage of switchers was 21%. However, the
magnitude of the difference is strongly influenced by the
fact that the chronically ill and disabled are in general
older, more often female and less highly educated than
the general population. The weighted percentage for the
chronically ill and disabled is 19%.
The percentage of switchers in 2006 is much higher than
in the situation before the insurance reform, when it was
approximately 3% for the publicly insured and 6% for the
privately insured [23,24].
Table 2: Description of respondents: age, sex and education, 
April 2006
Chronically ill and 
disabled (n = 3211)
General population 
(n = 1198)
Age
18–44 14% 34%
45–64 41% 42%
65 → 46% 24%
Sex
Male 36% 44%
Education
Lower 46% 19%
Intermediate 39% 72%
Higher 15% 9%BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
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Results show that younger people are switching more
often than older people. 27% of the 18–44 year old
switched insurance company (Table 3). This pattern is the
same for the general population and the chronically ill.
Although people 65 years and older are switching less
often than younger people, they still switch more often
than people did in the old system. Men have switched less
often than women. 18% of the male population and 23%
of the female population switched their insurance com-
pany. This pattern is again the same for the general popu-
lation and the chronically ill and disabled. Higher
educated people switched more often than lower edu-
cated people. This might be caused by differences in
knowledge and understanding of information.
Healthier people more often switch health insurance
(Table 4). However, there is an interesting interaction. In
the general population people with very bad self-per-
ceived health switch more often than the same category
amongst the chronically ill and disabled. For those with
very good health the opposite is the case: there are more
switchers amongst the chronically ill. Figure 1 shows the
difference in effects of subjective health status between the
general population and the chronically ill on their switch-
ing behaviour. It might be that people from the general
population who perceive their health as very bad are in
better health than people from the chronically ill and dis-
abled who perceive their health as very bad. For the chron-
ically ill and disabled population who perceive their
health status as very good, it can be reasoned that they
very well know what they need insurance for and that they
feel capable to search for the most appropriate health
insurer and insurance plan.
The first hypothesis is partly confirmed. Young and
healthy people indeed switch insurer more often than eld-
erly or people in bad health. It was not confirmed that the
chronically ill and disabled switch less often than the gen-
eral population when both populations are comparable
on age, sex and education. However, given the fact that
these two populations do differ on these variables we have
to take into account that the actual percentage of switchers
is lower in the population of chronically ill and disabled,
as shown by the unweighted data.
Many people have used the possibility to obtain a dis-
count on the premium for the basic package by joining a
collective. In the general population 56% did so and
among the chronically ill and disabled 42% unweighted
and 47% when the data are weighted towards the age, sex
and educational distribution of the general population
(not presented in tables). The logistic regression (not pre-
sented in tables) shows no significant differences between
both groups when additionally controlling for subjective
health. People in working age, of male gender, higher edu-
Table 4: Logistic regression model for switching health insurer, 
April 2006
Exp (B) p-waarde
Age
18–44 1.96 0.00
45–64 1.71 0.00
65 → reference
Sex
Male 0.79 0.04
Female reference
Education
Lower 0.44 0.00
Intermediate 0.73 0.03
Higher reference
Perceived health status
Bad 0.54 0.00
Good 0.67 0.04
Very good reference
Panel
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel 0.59 0.20
National Panel of Chronically ill and 
Disabled
reference
Interactions with panel
Age
18–44 1.11 0.72
45–64 0.94 0.80
Sex
Male 1.07 0.73
Education
Lower 1.32 0.44
Intermediate 1.25 0.46
Perceived health status
Bad 2.22 0.00
Good 1.53 0.10
Constant 0.33 0.00
Table 3: Percentage of people switching health insurer and their 
characteristics, weighted for age, sex and education, unweighted 
figures between brackets, April 2006
Chronically ill and 
disabled
General population
Age
18–44 24% (24%) 27%
45–64 18% (17%) 20%
65 → 12% (10%) 13%
Sex
Male 15% (14%) 18%
Female 21% (16%) 23%
Education
Lower 11% (10%) 14%
Intermediate 21% (18%) 22%
Higher 25% (23%) 23%
Perceived health status
Bad 15% (12%) 21%
Good 20% (17%) 20%
Very good 29% (25%) 23%
TOTAL 19% (14%) 21%BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
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cated and in better subjective health more often choose
for a collective insurance. This is related to the fact that
most of the collective discounts were offered via people's
job [25].
So, in a multivariate analysis the chronically ill and disa-
bled are not less often using collective insurance, but
given the fact that they differ systematically from the gen-
eral population in their socio-demographic characteristics
and subjective health the unweighted percentage of col-
lectively insured is lower among the chronically ill and
disabled. However, this seems not to be attributable to the
mere fact that they are chronically ill or disabled. The sec-
ond hypothesis is therefore refuted.
Reasons for switching and importance of different aspects 
in choosing an insurance package
Collective offers are reported most often as reason for
switching health insurer, for both the chronically ill and
disabled and the general population (Table 5). The per-
centage of the chronically ill and disabled that reports
content of the insurance package, both coverage in general
and coverage of compulsory insurance, as reasons for
switching is much higher than it is for the general popula-
tion. Quality of care was not often a reason to switch, nei-
ther for the chronically ill nor for the general population.
Besides reasons for switching we asked respondents how
important different aspects, like premium and content of
the package, are in choosing an insurance package. Table
6 shows the percentage of people who switched insurer
that rate an aspect as (very) important. This analysis
shows differences between the general population and the
chronically ill for quality, free choice of health care pro-
vider, free acceptance for compulsory insurance and the
coverage of specific devices and medications. For each of
these items the percentage of switchers amongst the
chronically ill that rate the item as important is higher
than it is for the general population. The chronically ill
and disabled seem to be more interested in content
related issues than insured from the general population.
The third hypothesis is confirmed. For the general popu-
lation, people who generally do not use health care often,
premium is more important than content, while the
chronically ill and disabled value content of the insurance
package as well. However, quality of care is not important
for either group as a reason for switching (Table 5).
Finally, the fourth hypothesis, stating that a collective
offer is less often an important reason for switching for the
chronically ill and disabled was refuted. For both popula-
tions switching health insurer is related to collective
offers, and being chronically ill or disabled has not been
found to be related to switching behaviour.
Discussion
In this article we have studied switching of health plan by
Dutch insured after the major insurance reform of January
2006. We have both looked at actual switching and at rea-
sons for doing so. We have compared the general popula-
tion with people with a chronic illness or disability.
The percentage that switched health insurer at the intro-
duction of the new insurance system was high compared
to the situation in the old system. The chronically ill and
disabled switched health insurer less often than the gen-
eral population. However, when we take into account the
Table 5: Reasons for switching health insurer (data for the 
chronically ill and disabled weighted to the age, sex and 
educational composition of the general population, unweighted 
figures between brackets); April 2006
Chronically ill and 
disabled (N = 544)*
General 
population 
(N = 222)*
Attractive collective offer 68% (66%) 56%
Premium of the package offered 38% (38%) 41%
Coverage of the package 
offered
33% (33%) 15%
Coverage compulsory 
insurance
25% (23%) 18%
Premium compulsory insurance 15% (16%) 19%
Other reason 10% (11%) 11%
Service level of the insurer 10% (9%) 9%
Coverage basic package 8% (8%) 6%
Quality of care 6% (5%) 5%
In kind/restitution policy 4% (4%) 3%
Deductible in combination with 
discount
2% (3%) 5%
* number of switchers
Switching behaviour and subjective health status for the gen- eral population (n = 1086) and the chronically ill and disabled  (n = 3132); April 2006 Figure 1
Switching behaviour and subjective health status for the gen-
eral population (n = 1086) and the chronically ill and disabled 
(n = 3132); April 2006.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Bad Good Very good
subjective health status
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
e
r
s
General population
Chronically ill and
disabled
 BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
Page 7 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
fact that the chronically ill and disabled are older, more
often female and less highly educated than the general
population, the difference disappears. Switching was not
based on considerations of quality of care for either
group. Premium and collective offers were more impor-
tant for mobility of insured in the general population. In
line with our expectations, content of insurance package
was more important for the chronically ill and disabled
than for the general population.
Collective offers are important reasons for switching and
many people have chosen a collective insurance. The per-
centage covered by a collective insurance is higher among
the general population, but again, this is explained by the
differences in socio-demographic composition.
The philosophy behind introducing more choice in health
care systems is that it is a way to protect the well-being of
insured [19]. Switching insurer is seen as an important sig-
nal to insurance companies that insured are dissatisfied
with levels of service or quality of care. However, quality
of care only plays a role when there are indeed differences
between insurers in this respect and when people who
switch act in these differences in quality. Neither seem to
be the case. People do not perceive differences between
health insurers in quality of care [26] and quality of care
was mentioned as a reason to switch by only a small per-
centage of both groups. If reasons for switching are unre-
lated to the quality of care, it is hard to believe that
switching influences the quality of care.
Mobility of insured people is an important pillar in the
new Dutch insurance system. We studied two groups of
insured: the general population and the chronically ill
and disabled. The chronically ill and disabled have sub-
stantial experience with health care and are able to judge
service level and quality. These groups therefore have the
possibility to give insurance companies a signal that they
are dissatisfied with these aspects. The signals healthy
people give mainly relate to the premium. In order to use
mobility of insured as a mechanism to enhance service
and quality, it is important that chronically ill and disa-
bled switch insurance company when they are dissatis-
fied. In the new Dutch system barriers to switch insurance
company have been removed in order to let the insured
influence premium, service and quality of care by switch-
ing health insurer. As yet there are no signs of barriers to
switch insurer for the chronically ill and disabled [27].
It is unclear what the percentage of people switching
insurers should be in order to create competition between
insurance companies on premium and quality. It might
be that the mere threat of mobility of insured is enough to
keep insurance companies active. However, high levels of
mobility could also have negative effects; mobility brings
administrative costs and when consumer mobility is high
collective costs will increase. These collective costs could
be the cause of increased premiums.
Switching insurer was rather high in this first year of the
new insurance system. Mass media attention might have
made choice situation more salient. Furthermore, in the
old system people with private insurance could not easily
switch insurer. In the first year of the new system, insur-
ance companies were generous in accepting people for
additional insurance. There were hardly any problems
Table 6: Percentage of switchers and non-switchers who rate an aspect as (very) important (weighted figures, unweighted figures 
between brackets)
Chronically ill and disabled General population
Switchers Non-switchers Switchers Non-switchers
Premium 86% (84%) 73% (73%)** 83% 75%***
Coverage 94% (93%) 92% (92%) 92% 94%
Premium compulsory insurance 86% (83%) 76% (76%)** 84% 77%***
Coverage compulsory insurance 90% (89%) 88% (88%) 91% 89%
Deductible in combination with a discount 18% (21%) 28% (31%)** 20% 19%
Quality of care 89% (87%) 91% (91%) 80%* 89%***
Service of insurer 86% (86%) 89% (90%) 82% 88%***
In kind/restitution policy 41% (45%) 48% (51%)** 42% 46%
Collective offer 72% (73%) 51% (51%)** 70% 50%***
Free choice of health care provider 77% (76%) 60% (62%)** 60%* 56%
Free acceptance for compulsory insurance 79% (78%) 66% (68%)** 70% 65%
Content like specific health arrangements 38% (40%) 39% (44%) 33% 37%
Coverage of specific devices of medications 73% (74%) 73% (75%) 55%* 62%***
* significant difference between general population and chronically ill and disabled switchers
** chronically ill and disabled: significant difference between switchers and non-switchers
*** general population: significant difference between switchers and non-switchersBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:58 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/58
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with taking out additional insurance. People might have
taken the opportunity to switch insurance company or to
take out a large additional insurance package. It could be
questioned whether the increased mobility will continue
in the future, or that it was just a onetime event. Latest fig-
ures suggest that it was indeed a onetime event, switching
rates have decreased to the level of before the introduction
of the new insurance system [28].
In the Dutch system, insurers must accept every applicant
for the basic package, irrespective their age, health status
and other characteristics. For additional insurance there
are no such rules; insurers can refuse applicants for addi-
tional insurance. Although insured are allowed to have
their basic insurance from another insurer than their addi-
tional insurance, there is a possibility of risk selection
through the additional insurance. It is very unlikely that
insurers will remain generous in accepting people for
additional insurance. Insured can be locked in with their
insurer, because of their additional insurance. Although
possible, it is not likely that they switch for the basic insur-
ance only, because it is administratively unattractive. It
will be interesting to examine whether this will happen in
the future. In more general terms: do all insured (feel to)
have the possibility to switch to another insurer?
In this article the general population was compared to the
chronically ill and disabled. This comparison was based
on the idea that the general population on average use less
care than the chronically ill and disabled. Therefore, for
the chronically ill and disabled content of the insurance
package is more important. Besides, it is probably easier to
know what kind of care is needed when someone is
chronically ill or disabled, than when it is unknown what
kind of illness one might be confronted with in the future.
The chronically ill and disabled know what kind of care
they probably need for their illness and therefore know
what they need insurance for. Differences between the
chronically ill and disabled and the general population
are small when the difference in composition between
both categories is taken into account. It is not disablement
or chronic illness as such that keeps people from switch-
ing health plans, but rather the fact that older people and
lower educated people tend to switch less often and are
over-represented among the chronically ill and disabled.
Irrespective of how one interprets this result, the fact
remains that some population categories switch less often.
This can be seen as a sign of the existence of inequalities.
If these differences are related to specific groups that can
be characterised according to needs, like certain patient
groups, we speak of inequities [29]. Therefore, how bene-
fits of the new system of regulated competition are distrib-
uted and why this is so should be investigated [9].
The transition from a planned health care system to regu-
lated competition is an example of a market transition in
a specific area within a market economy. Market transi-
tions have been claimed to increase inequalities [10,11].
In this case inequalities could show up in different fields.
In the insurance market, some insurance organizations
gain and others loose and some categories of the popula-
tion might profit more from competition than others. In
the health care provision market, some providers might
be better able to adapt to a competitive environment. And
finally, in the health care purchasing market some provid-
ers might be able to negotiate attractive contracts with
insurance organizations and others not. Market transition
theory focuses attention to the possibility of developing
inequalities that might result in inequities. Even though
the new Dutch insurance system has guarantees to prevent
cream skimming inequities could arise.
Conclusion
There is increased mobility in the new system for both the
general population and the chronically ill and disabled.
This however is not based on quality of care. The general
assumption of the system is that mobility between insur-
ers is based on considerations of both premium and qual-
ity. Thus, consumers would exert pressure towards
insurers to keep premium low and improve quality of
care. If reasons for switching are unrelated to the quality
of care, it is hard to believe that switching influences the
quality of care. The Dutch system is designed to prevent
the development of inequalities between for instance
healthy and unhealthy people, such as the chronically ill
and disabled. As yet there are no signs of barriers to switch
insurer for the chronically ill and disabled. This however
could change in the future and it is therefore important to
monitor changes.
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